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Abstract 
This study examines the potential impact of works councils and unions on the use and intensity of 
use of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work. There is little indication that these 
variables are correlated with the use/non-use of either type of temporary work, especially in the 
case of fixed-term contracts Collective bargaining displays different relationships with their 
intensity of use: a negative association for sectoral bargaining and fixed-term contracts and the 
converse for firm-level bargaining and agency temps. Of more interest, however, is the covariation 
between the number of temporary employees and the interaction between works councils and 
product market volatility. The intensity of use of agency temps (fixed-term contracts) is predicted 
to rise (fall) as volatility increases whenever a works council is present. These disparities require 
further investigation but most likely reflect differences in function, with agency work being more 
directed toward the protection of an arguably shrinking core and fixed-term contacts encountering 
resistance to their increased use as a buffer stock. The two types of temporary employment are 
seemingly noncomplementary, an interpretation that receives support from the study’s further 
analysis of fixed-term contract flow data. 
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I.  Introduction 
In Germany, as in other countries, controversy attaches to the use of temporary employment. On 
the one hand, it has been linked to heightened labor market duality, and on the other to increased 
labor market flexibility offering improved labor market access and fostering job creation. But the 
tenor of the German debate has differed somewhat from that in other countries given that nation’s 
unique performance during the Great Recession in 2008/9, when it was able to successfully 
negotiate economic adversity without an increase in unemployment or a decline in the number of 
jobs. That experience may at once have both reflected and further influenced the thinking of key 
players – unions, works councils, and employers – on temporary employment; with the worker 
side being more accepting of it and employers for a variety of reasons (including it must be said 
the prospect of reregulation) being less motivated to use temporary employment as a low-road 
strategy. The two types of temporary employment considered in the present treatment are 
temporary agency work/workers (TAW/TAWs) and fixed-term contracts (FTCs). Even if they may 
be less atypical or contingent than other non-standard types of employment in Germany, such as 
marginal part-time work, both can be compared – provisionally at least – with their counterpart 
entities in other nations. 
Other-country research, and typically that in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, has tended to focus 
upon employment transitions and whether or not temporary employment functions as a stepping 
stone to regular employment, with frankly pessimistic conclusions on net. (This is particularly true 
of U.S. studies of temporary agency employment; see, for example, Addison and Surfield 2009; 
Houseman 2014.) Although a major component of the German literature has not shied away from 
equating agency work in particular with precarious employment and the notion of a shrinking core 
(of regular employment), German research has tended more to look at issues such as the 
operational reasons for using different types of temporary work, issues of intensity of use, and, 
most recently, the role of temporary agency work in particular as a driver of labor market 
dynamism leading to higher productivity and enhanced job security of regular workers without 
impairing the job access of temps themselves.  
But the fact remains that in Germany as elsewhere our knowledge of temporary 
employment remains partial at best. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of the role 
of institutions, the topic of the present inquiry. Only latterly have studies sought to incorporate 
worker representation in works councils and unions and the interplay between these institutions 
and product market volatility and even to distinguish between types of temporary employment in 
this regard. Our treatment is firmly anchored in this new institutionalist tradition. Specifically, it 
seeks to examine the effect of workplace representation and collective bargaining on the use and 
the intensity of use of temporary employment over the sample period 2006-2015, distinguishing 
between FTCs and TAW. The potentially crucial role of product market volatility in shaping the 
response of labor market institutions is accorded special emphasis, not least since this interplay 
may assist in explaining the different effects of ‘unions’ reported in a literature that has neglected 
the volatility argument. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II contains a thematic review of the 
literature on temporary employment together with some key theoretical expectations. The principal 
dataset employed here, the IAB Establishment Panel, is addressed in section III. Section IV 
contains the distinctive model used in this empirical inquiry and its justification. Detailed findings 
are presented in section IV and are followed by a sensitivity analysis in section VI.  Section VII 
concludes.  
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II. Literature Review 
The literature on temporary employment has focused on FTCs and TAW without necessarily 
considering both or distinguishing between them. Where the two have received separate 
consideration, attention has tended to focus on either their contribution to flexibility in markets 
often characterized by tightly regulated open-ended employment or, more commonly perhaps, on 
their impact as stepping stones to regular employment as opposed to a being a dead end outcome 
associated with heightened labor market duality. Our review of the German literature will 
necessarily touch upon issues that have preoccupied the wider literature not least because our 
sample period follows intervals of liberalization of the rules governing the two types of contract, 
especially temporary agency work. That said, an important part of our discussion we will pay close 
attention to two other-country studies that offer guidance as to the likely impact of worker 
representation and collective bargaining on the occurrence and extent of FTCs and TAW. Very 
few German studies have directly investigated the impact of works councils and collective 
bargaining on temporary employment. This is in sharp contrast with the literature on workplace 
representation and firm performance where German studies have been in the vanguard (see 
Addison 2009).  
Our opening descriptive remarks will form the backdrop to the labor institution questions 
that motivate the present analysis. They cover the course and role of TAW and FTCs over most of 
our sample period and are well rehearsed in survey papers by Spermann (2011) and Eichhorst and 
Tobsch (2013). The former study charts the major growth in agency work after the Hartz 1 reforms 
in Germany (see the Legal Appendix in Addison et al. 2018: 28). Spermann notes that staffing 
agencies were the leading drivers of job creation. Even if their penetration rate (i.e. their share of 
all workers covered by social insurance) is reported as only 2.6% and procyclical, the share of 
TAWs among individuals entering and leaving the workforce is considerable. The stepping-stone 
hypothesis is also addressed by Spermann, who observes that although there is little general 
evidence favoring the argument that temporary employment acts as a springboard into regular 
employment, TAW has an access-to-work function improving the likelihood of the unemployed 
being employed in the future (Kvasnika 2009), even in open-ended employment (Lehmer and 
Ziegler 2010).1 
Spermann’s review is particularly useful in documenting who uses TAW, the reasons for 
so doing, and the intensity of use. To illustrate, some 3% of enterprises used agency temps in 2008, 
usage being heavily dependent upon firm size with almost one-quarter of mid-sized enterprises 
(50-249 employees) and one-half of large enterprises (≥250 employees) making use of temps 
between 2003 and 2005. Intensity of use also varies directly with firm size (Crimmann et al. 2009). 
Among the structural (e.g. industry affiliation) and functional factors (e.g. firms undergoing 
organizational transformation), Spermann cites work by Promberger (2009) indicating that the 
deployment of temporary work arrangements is more likely in enterprises with a works council, 
the stated justification being that ‘moderate’ use of TAW helps secure the jobs of the permanent 
workforce.2  
Eichhorst and Tobsch (2013), while focusing on the theme of labor market segmentation 
more generally, seek to draw a distinction between fixed-term contracts and agency temporary 
work. Fixed-term contracts are said to mainly affect job entrants in the private sector, apprentices, 
and mostly young employees in the public, academic, and social sectors. Agency temps for their 
part are mainly concentrated among basic occupations in the manufacturing sector and some office 
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services offering more limited prospects for transition to permanent jobs. FTCs have remained 
constant at about 7 to 8% of total employment, although this total excludes about the same share 
in apprenticeship contracts proper. TAW has grown since 2001 but, as noted earlier, it accounts 
for a much smaller share of total employment. Its growth is primarily attributed to labor market 
reforms and related restructuring of companies in the manufacturing sector since the mid-2000s. 
That said, we also note that this acceleration has been outpaced by the growth in part-time work 
and marginal part-time work. 
Although Eichhorst and Tobsch report that there is significant mobility out of FTCs and 
TAW, they again seek to draw a distinction between the two. They argue that the transition from 
a FTC to a permanent contract is relatively frequent in Germany and in particular for young people 
entering the private sector for whom FTCs – abstracting from apprenticeships – are to be seen as 
an extended probationary period, also noting that their continuous renewal is widespread in the 
three sectors noted above where specific conditions prevail. (Different rules obtain for FTCs 
implemented with and without cause; that is, where the employer either provides or does not 
provide ‘objective’ reasons for their deployment; see the Legal Appendix in Addison et al. 2018: 
26-27). Mobility from TAW to permanent direct employment is stated to be more problematic 
given the concentration of agency work among basic occupations and in firms subject to 
restructuring, leading Eichhorst and Tobsch (2013: 21-22) to refer pessimistically to the “distinct 
institutional arrangements and functional logic of agency work in Germany.” The authors, who 
subscribe to a shrinking core model, duly see the policy issues as different in kind. For FTCs, the 
main problem is seen as the reluctance of public sector employers to convert these temporary jobs 
into permanent jobs because of the near impossibility of firing civil servants and public employees 
with tenure. For its part, the problem of TAW is viewed as akin to that of marginal part-time work, 
albeit one with a very different solution: re-regulation and a heightened influence of collective 
bargaining. As a practical matter, we note that by the end of our sample period and beyond there 
are indeed indications of a shift back towards re-regulation (see Addison et al. 2018).   
Other authors while also preserving the distinction between the two forms of temporary 
employment have offered a rather different pro-productivity diagnosis. Thus, for example, drawing 
on the fact that use of TAW in Germany is high by European standards (see Hirsch 2016: 1192), one 
explanation has centered on the high matching efficiency of the temporary help sector vis-à-vis 
the public employment service (Neugart and Storrie 2006). Another is the comparatively recent 
finding of a strong positive effect of TAW on productivity; or, more accurately, a robust hump-
shaped relation between intensity of use and firm productivity. Specifically, using seven waves of 
the IAB Establishment Panel for the years 2003-2009, Hirsch and Müller (2012) report maximum 
productivity effects occurring at agency temp employment shares of between 7.5 and 15% across 
OLS, fixed effects, and system GMM estimators. For their preferred specification, establishment 
gross value added peaks at 14.2% at a temp share of 11.3%. As Jahn and Rosholm (2018: 8) note, 
these results are consistent with the notion that the tighter regulation of the other type of contingent 
employment considered here, namely FTCs, has incentivized user firms to use agency temps to 
adapt their workforce to changing economic conditions. (They contend that FTCs play a minor 
role in securing flexibility for German firms unlike the situation in other countries such as southern 
European nations.) FTCs, so the argument runs, are primarily screening devices promoting good 
job matches between workers and firms. And indeed there is some real indication that German 
such contracts do offer a pathway to permanent employment, particularly in those circumstances 
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where the normal probationary period for regular employment offers insufficient time to assess the 
quality of the match, as might often be the case for university graduates (Boockmann and Hagen 
2008). That said, even if a little over one-half of FTCs are typically converted into permanent 
contracts, the fact remains that they likely fulfill in part a secondary labor market function as well 
with some incumbents encountering a risk of repeated unemployment. Accordingly, a more 
balanced reading would be that FTCs are ‘less contingent’ than is TAW – which interpretation is 
not to deny that strict dismissal protection in Germany might mean that screening considerations 
are also relevant for (some) less skilled workers too (see Hirsch and Müller 2012: F219).  
Even if firms did not use TAW as a screening device, so that productivity benefits did not 
accrue from this source, there are other routes to productivity gain from using temps. Thus, and 
most familiarly, TAW allows firms to meet variability in demand, to buffer their regular labor 
markets during downturns, thereby allowing them to sustain their internal labor markets. And of 
course gains in productivity would also accrue to the extent that firms do use temps as a screening 
device in circumstances where such workers have a greater incentive to exert effort than most 
permanent employees. Nevertheless, to the extent that FTCs provide a secondary market, there is 
some scope for viewing each type of temporary employment in similar light. Bryson (2013) has 
also suggested that positive productivity effects might arise where temps are potential substitutes 
for regular workers, on this occasion serving to motivate the latter to improve their productivity to 
forestall their replacement. This is an alternative to the complementarity argument for greater 
productivity stemming from the buffering of regular employees during times of demand 
uncertainty, or by allowing regular employees to focus on core activities where they enjoy a 
comparative advantage. The pro-productivity argument(s) have stimulated German research to 
investigate whether the use of agency temps increases or decreases the employment stability of 
permanent employees – on which, see the differing empirical findings of Hirsch (2016) and Pfeifer 
(2005). By the same token, Bryson has countered that TAW may lower productivity where temps 
are less committed to the firm, have lower job satisfaction, or have unintended spillover effects on 
regular employees, lowering their morale and commitment to the firm.3  
 Theoretically ambiguous effects of temporary employment on productivity are the 
takeaway from this discussion, and we have yet to broach in any detail the subject of workplace 
representation and collective bargaining. To get one step closer to the role of this different set of 
institutions we now turn to two non-German studies that directly examine labor organizational 
influences on temporary employment. Each seeks to accommodate some disparate findings of 
earlier institutionalist treatments while also directly informing our own empirical inquiry. In the 
first study, Salvatori (2009) uses the Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-Life 
Balance (ESWT) for 2004/2005, covering 21 EU nations and a sample of more than 21,000 
workplaces. Salvatori’s estimates point to a positive association between union presence and the 
probability of the workplace having employed FTCs and TAWs at some time in the 12 months 
preceding the survey, even after allowing for the endogeneity of union status. That said, he cautions 
that this result could arise from a buffer effect (benefitting core workers) or alternatively stem from 
the actions of employers seeking to undermine the union strength in collective bargaining (see 
below). Note further that ‘unions’ in this study encompass any form of workplace representation, 
and so include works councils as well as unions per se, and that the results fracture when collective 
bargaining is conducted at levels higher than the workplace or organization. 
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The finding of a positive association between unionization and temporary employment is 
also reported in an innovative study by Devicienti, Naticchioni, and Ricci (hereafter DNR) (2018), 
which is notable for its recognition and interpretation of the interplay between unions and product 
market volatility and in distinguishing between different types of FTCs. Using Italian firm-level 
data for 2005 and 2007, the authors estimate OLS, IV, and FE models regressing a firm’s 
propensity to use fixed-term contracts on product market volatility, presence of a union at the 
workplace, the interaction between volatility and union presence, and a set of controls that include 
labor force composition and firm age, and dummies for firm size, sector, and region. Volatility is 
computed as the average standard deviation of log sales over the period 1997 to 2005, calculated 
at the three-digit industry level. In the IV models, workplace unionization is instrumented with the 
two-year lagged mean unionization at the industry and regional level.  
Results of the OLS model for the most parsimonious specification containing volatility and 
union presence indicate that the former is positively and the latter is negatively associated with the 
use of fixed-term contracts, which might suggest that greater volatility encourages firms to employ 
these temporary workers so as to facilitate the adjustment of the labor input, while unions for their 
part seek to counter such moves to avoid any dilution of membership and union authority. 
However, in the next iteration the interaction term is negative and statistically significant while 
the coefficient estimate for the union term is no longer statistically significant, instead suggesting 
that union impact is bound up with uncertainty. The corresponding IV estimates confirm the 
volatility result for the parsimonious equation (but the union effect is now insignificant), while 
fuller specifications corroborate the finding of a negative interaction term between volatility and 
unions while pointing to a significantly positive union coefficient estimate. The baseline FE model 
is quite consistent with the previous baseline results for volatility and the now very small union 
coefficient estimate can be interpreted as implying that when the interaction term is omitted the 
union effect becomes small and insignificant as it picks up average volatility, meaning that at low 
(high) volatility the union effect is positive (negative).4 When the interaction term is duly ‘added 
back’ all the previous effects obtain.  
In a final empirical application, the authors estimate the IV and FE variants of the model 
across two distinct types of FTCs, namely training contracts and those not offering training. For 
nontraining contracts all the previous results obtain. In the case of training contracts, however, 
none of these arguments plays a role. The authors argue that in the presence of a core labor force 
that enjoys a high level of employment protection, firms will not seek to deal with a volatile market 
environment by offering difficult-to-amortize training contracts. For their part, unions are seen to 
have an interest in some level of nontraining contracts that act as a buffer stock and protect 
permanent workers to some degree addition, whereas training contracts cannot act as a buffer 
stock. In addition, firms may see in these cheaper contracts some protection against aggressive 
unions.  
The authors see their results as offering a framework capable of explaining disparate results 
reported in the literature on unions and temporary employment. To repeat, the key is the interplay 
between unions and volatility. Unlike volatility, which has a positive effect on FTC employment, 
the union effect is not transparent. Rather, it depends on the degree of volatility, different degrees 
of which are capable in principle of explaining the different effect of unions reported in treatments 
that exclude the volatility argument.  
7 
 
Now the German industrial relations system clearly differs from those evaluated in these 
two econometric studies. It is still broadly characterized by collective bargaining at industry or 
branch level and worker representation through works councils at establishment and company 
levels. If we insert into this setting the broader position taken on unions by the literature – to the 
effect that they represent permanent workers and use their bargaining strength to increase the 
wages/expected firing costs of permanent workers – the implication is that national unions will be 
sensitive to the depletion of union power occasioned by the use of temporary employment. Works 
councils may respond more favorably to the inevitable demand of employers to use more 
temporary employment. Here we might add the caveat ‘under sectoral agreements,’ as research 
has suggested that even in circumstances where levels of mutual trust are high, German works 
councilors unlike employers have seemingly shown only a marginal preference for decentralized 
bargaining (see Nienhueser and Hossfeld 2011). If we now introduce uncertainty into this mix, 
one encounters the familiar argument that temporary workers are a peripheral buffer for the core 
of permanent workers. However, we would expect the acceptance by workplace representation of 
actions in defense of the core to be conditioned by union attitudes toward trading off bargaining 
power for employment stability. 
However, if at the outset one abandons the view that the nature of employment relations is 
adversarial and enters a world of incomplete contracting, an efficient governance apparatus 
engaging unions as a central player may eschew temporary contracts under normal circumstances. 
One aspect of this cooperation may be wage moderation and/or greater internal employment 
flexibility. So local unions/works councils may be associated with less atypical work because 
segmentation of the internal labor market damages worker cohesion and serves to frustrate the 
cooperative industrial relations solution to the standard problems that attach to incomplete 
contracting, namely the incentives that exist ex post for the parties to break contractual 
commitments made ex ante. In this scenario, then, we would observe a negative relation between 
local unions/works councils and temporary employment. 
From the perspective of this cooperative industrial relations model, any tendency on the 
part of covered firms to have greater recourse to temporary employment in the face of increased 
uncertainty is generally assumed to be less than in nonunionized firms. If this is the case, the 
periphery is of secondary importance throughout and the efficient contracting model deviates from 
its core-periphery counterpart in predicting a (consistently) negative relation between local 
unions/works councils and temporary employment. However, ambiguity surrounding the union 
effect persists because we do not know the reach of continuity labor markets and their sensitivity 
to change.  
Yet we would argue that progress has been made in integrating uncertainty in empirical 
applications. For DNR, as we have seen, product market volatility assumes center-stage. Here the 
argument is that the effect of local unions (and necessarily other forms of workplace representation 
as well) will likely hinge on product market volatility. In particular, volatility adds an element of 
heterogeneity into the impact of unions on a firm’s desire for temporary employment, such that a 
generally positive effect of workplace unions on the use of temporary employment contracts 
morphs in the presence of heighted uncertainty/volatility to a negative association. This at least is 
the prediction of the standard core-periphery model, and for DNR is also expected for continuity 
markets as well.  
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This returns us to potential differences in the two types of temporary work contract even if 
few individual studies have jointly examined the correlates of each. Given that fixed-term contracts 
achieve a number of roles other than short term filling in, as it were, we might expect real 
differences in the results for the two types of temporary contract, even if there is some modest 
evidence in the literature of complementarity in their deployment (Pfeifer 2005: 414). By analogy 
with DNR’s training contracts, FTCs are not expected to be used in any substantive measure to 
offer protection to the core of permanent workers. Further, to the extent that they are used for this 
purpose, there is the suggestion that they will be a smaller threat than TAW to a union at least as 
their incumbents will likely engage in more union activity and join unions.  At first blush it may 
also be tempting to argue that changes in the intensity of use of FTCs and TAW will be 
directionally the same in circumstances where works councils are buffeted by increased product 
market volatility. However, to the extent that such entities might eschew the use of TAWs in 
normal times by reason of their lower skill levels and experience they may nonetheless have to 
embrace them in extremis to protect the survival of a shrinking core. On the other hand, a secular 
shrinking core allied to deskilling and organizational transformation is unlikely to characterize the 
large majority of establishments hiring workers under FTCs. 
In the light of the above, it would be idle to pretend that theory offers settled predictions 
regarding the effects of worker representation on the use and intensity of use of TAW and FTCs. 
Despite its ambiguities, however, the literature is highly informative of the arguments appropriate 
to any such inquiry, while suggestive of patterns of association in the data and, as we shall see, 
potential improvements in model specification. 
 
III. The Data  
In this study we employ the IAB Establishment Panel, which is a large-scale representative survey 
dataset of establishments in Germany sponsored by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
The IAB Establishment Panel has been available since 1993 and comprises some 15,000 to 16,000 
establishment interviews per year. It provides detailed information on the demand side of the labor 
market as of the reference date (i.e. June 30 in each year); in particular, concerning the structure 
of the establishment’s workforce, labor turnover, business policies (including investment and 
training), and performance. Apart from its strong panel dimension, with a yearly continuation 
response rate of over 80 percent, new establishments enter the survey in every wave to both 
compensate for non-responses/panel mortality and to mirror firm dynamics (i.e. births and deaths). 
For a more detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel, the reader is referred to Ellguth, 
Kohaut, and Möller (2014). 
In order to shed light on the different aspects of the relationship between industrial relations 
institutions and the employment of fixed-term and agency workers we select five separate outcome 
variables. The first is the number of TAWs employed by an establishment (Y1), the second is the 
corresponding number of FTC workers (Y2), while the other three dependent variables exploit 
additional information only available for FTCs. They comprise the number of workers with a FTC 
among the new hires (Y3), the number of workers with a FTC that transition into permanent 
employment (Y4), and the number of workers whose FTC is renewed (Y5). Outcomes Y3 through 
Y5 are flow variables pertaining to the first half of the year (i.e. observed from January to June), 
whereas Y1 and Y2 are stocks measured at the reference date (i.e. June 30). For most of our analyses, 
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we shall employ an unbalanced panel covering the years 2006 through 2015, with the exception of 
variable Y5, for which the required information is only available from 2009 to 2015. Only 
establishments with at least 5 employees are included in our estimation sample. We further restrict 
the sample to privately-owned, for-profit organizations, by eliminating from the raw sample all 
those establishments that are either publicly owned or report a budget volume when asked about 
their sales revenues. 
The labor institution variables are flagged by 1/0 dummies indicating whether there is a 
works council, a sector-level collective wage agreement, or a company-level collective wage 
agreement. (Additional labor organizational variables will be deployed in our separate sensitivity 
analysis.) Throughout our investigation, the presence of a works council will be interacted with 
product demand volatility, drawing directly upon DNR (2018). This variable is, for each year and 
for each industry, given by the average standard deviation of establishment log sales. Specifically, 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = (
1
𝑁𝑖−1
∑ {log(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑒
𝑁𝑖
𝑒=1 − log(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑖}
2)1/2, where the subscripts e and i denote 
establishment and industry, respectively, and 𝑁𝑖 is the number of establishments in industry i 
(subscript t omitted). To further reduce the possibility of potential endogeneity of the volatility 
variable, we take the average of the past 6 years, so that the demand volatility measure in year t is 
the average over t-1, t-2, …, t-6. Observe that the use of an average over an industry and not the 
establishment’s own sales is also helpful in this regard. The sample comprises a total of forty-three 
3-digit industries, which are then aggregated into 19 industry dummies.  
         Our set of control variables includes workforce composition (namely the share of women, 
part-time workers, employees hired for simple tasks that do not require any vocational training, 
and employees hired for complex tasks that require either a vocational training certificate, a 
corresponding measure of professional experience, or a university or college degree) and the sum 
of gross wages. In addition, dummies indicating whether competitive pressure is reported to be 
high, some fraction of the output/sales volume is exported, parts of the establishment’s activity 
have been outsourced, and whether the technical standard of the capital stock is either excellent or 
good (versus either rather poor or completely outdated) are deployed, as well as measures of 
establishment age, size, industry affiliation, and location. Finally, some specifications also control 
for the establishment’s hiring rate (defined as the number of hires divided by the total number of 
employees), the employment share of FTC workers, and the proportion of employees who received 
further training during the first six months of the year.  
A full description of the variables and the corresponding means are given in Table 1. We 
briefly comment here on the main descriptive statistics of the selected outcomes (Y1 to Y5) for the 
entire sample and for the separate cases of establishments with and without works councils. By 
construction, all (unweighted) means are calculated at establishment level. On average, an 
establishment employs 5.72 TAWs and 9.62 workers with a FTC. From January to June, we also 
observe 3.59 new hires with a FTC, 3.00 workers whose FTCs were converted into permanent 
employment, and 2.47 workers with a FTC renewed in the same interval. On average, in works 
council establishments there are 17.79 temps and 22.26 FTCs, as compared with 0.97 temps and 
4.67 FTCs in establishments without works council. Seemingly, new FTC hires, FTC transitions, 
and FTC renewals are also higher in the sample of works councils, at 7.36, 4.17, and 3.26, workers 
respectively. The corresponding values in plants without works councils are 2.13, 1.95, and 1.78. 
10 
 
These are unconditional means without at this stage controls for other relevant establishment 
characteristics. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
IV. Modeling  
We employ a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model to analyze the determinants of the 
selected discrete response variables 𝑌𝑗𝑖 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 5. In this framework, subscript j denotes, 
respectively, the number of TAWs (𝑌1), workers with a FTC (𝑌2), new hires with a FTC (𝑌3), FTC 
conversions into permanent work (𝑌4), and workers whose FTC has been renewed (𝑌5) per 
establishment i. Again, the time subscript is omitted to simplify the notation. 
A key aspect of this modeling strategy is the presence of two underlying data generation 
processes. In the case of agency temps (𝑌1), for example, this means that on the one hand we have 
a process explaining an establishment’s participation in the hiring of temps and on the other, given 
the probability of its being a participant, an alternative process determining the extent of its usage 
or subsequent probability of using k (integer) temps, k = 0, 1, 2, …, m. This approach offers the 
possibility of separating the so-called certain (or excess) zeros – defined as the group of 
establishments for which the count is expected to be zero – from the alternative group of potential 
users for whom any non-negative count is possible. 
 Clearly, the ZINB offers a better fit to the data than an ordinary least squares regression: 
firstly, because there is a mass of zeros in the observed count; and, secondly, because the outcome 
variable is necessarily censored (non-negative). In turn, the ordinary Poisson model (or the 
negative binomial) does not tackle the issue of endogenous participation; that is, it does not 
distinguish the group of absolute zeros from the rest (i.e. the group of zeros ‘by choice’). As shown 
in the next section below, the relative frequency of zeros in our dataset is around 80%, raising 
concerns that a non-zero inflated model has the potential to introduce confounding factors that will 
bias the estimates. Using the ZINB model we will therefore examine the role of industrial relations 
institutions both at the extensive (participation) and intensive (use) margins, with respect to any of 
the selected response variables.  
Formally, and for illustrative purposes using the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) case,5 the 
response variables 𝑌𝑗1, 𝑌𝑗2, …, 𝑌𝑗𝑛  follow a binary process in which, for each 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 5, we 
have 𝑌𝑖~0  with probability 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑌𝑖~ Poisson (𝜆𝑖) with probability (1 − 𝑝𝑖) so that 𝑌𝑖 = 0 with 
probability 𝑝𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑒
−𝜆𝑖, and 𝑌𝑖 = k with probability (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑒
−𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑖
𝑘/𝑘!, 𝑘 = 1, 2, … (see, for 
example, Lambert 1992). In practical terms, the logistic regression explains participation based on 
a set of covariates A, followed by a count model with covariates B. In principle, there will be little 
prior information on the role of covariates in the A and B subsets. It is therefore possible to have a 
situation in which, say, a given covariate generates both higher participation and less intensive use, 
or conversely. In our case, the same set of regressors will be exploited in both decisions. The set 
of proposed statistical tests will then shed light on the relevant empirical hypotheses.  
Although the ZINB and ZIP models address the issue of endogenous participation, in the 
sense that each of them tackles the difficulty arising from the possibility that the observed zeros in 
the count model may come from two quite distinct groups, there remains the issue of endogenous 
treatment at the intensive margin. One possibility is that a works council establishment may have 
unobserved characteristics that generate both participation and intensity (that is, the number of 
temporary employees in the establishment). As we lack any good instrument to control for the 
possibility of endogenous treatment, and the instrumental variable approach in the context of zero-
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inflated models is unchartered territory, we will discuss the robustness of the ZINB results by 
experimenting with observables that may predetermine the works council and/or collective 
bargaining status. To this end, we will first examine, across different groups, some descriptive 
statistics on the reasons why establishments hire TAWs and the corresponding occurrence of 
human resource management practices. Next, we will complement this inferential analysis by 
introducing alternative measures of unionization into our ZINB model, even if data constraints 
compel us to utilize a single cross-section for 2010 rather than the pooled 2006-2015 data.  
 
V. Findings  
We begin by describing the pattern of our selected outcome variables over time. Observe firstly 
from panel (a) of Figure 1 that between 85 and 90% of all establishments do not employ any TAWs 
at all. This share is comparatively stable over time, although the trough in 2009 suggests that temps 
may have been deployed as a buffer stock in the face of demand volatility. For users, the share of 
temporary work is also rather flat over the period at around 8 to 9%.6 
[Figure 1 near here]  
A more detailed profile of the utilization of workers on fixed-term contracts is given in the 
remaining three panels of Figure 1. Panel (b) shows that, for establishments with new FTC hires, 
an extremely high percentage of new hires are FTC workers, at approximately 80% of the total. 
Given that user establishments (i.e. establishments in which the new hires have a FTC) comprise 
less than 60% of the total, the implication is that the overall incidence of FTCs among new hires 
is below 50% (see the continuous line at the bottom of the panel). 
Over the course of the sample period the transition from a FTC into an open-ended contract, 
shown in panel (c), is also slightly increasing and currently stands at roughly 50% (in the 
subsample of establishments with at least one FTC conversion). But a relatively small percentage 
of users actually convert their FTCs into open-ended contracts – they comprise approximately 20% 
of all establishments with FTC workers. Lastly, for the shorter 2009-2015 interval, information on 
the rate at which FTCs are renewed is shown in panel (d) of the figure. In common with the 
previous time-series, we have the result that the course of renewals is very flat over time, 
amounting to approximately 40% for establishments with at least one FTC renewal. 
We now turn to the frequency distribution of the five outcome variables, Y1 through Y5, in 
Table 2. Clearly, for the entire sample, there is a mass of zeros that in conjunction with the long 
right tail suggests (unconditional) overdispersion. Indeed, between 53.5% (in the case of the 
number of FTCs that transition into permanent employment, Y4) and 80.9% (in the case of the 
number of TAWs, Y1) of all establishment-year observations have a count equal to zero, with the 
number of counts greater than zero decreasing quite rapidly for all response variables. For example, 
in the case of Y2, the number of zeros (i.e. those situations in which establishments are non-users 
of FTCs) accounts for 57.5% of the total. The percentage of establishments reporting a number of 
FTCs greater than zero and less than 10 is 26.8%, while for the following class of 10-50 FTC 
workers it decreases to 11.5% of the total. This pattern holds for all the other response variables 
as well. Based on Table 1, it is also clear that the variance is much larger than the mean.7 
[Table 2 near here] 
As discussed in section IV, our empirical analysis relies on a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model. Estimates of the model are provided in Table 3. For all five outcomes, Y1 through 
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Y5, a common set of regressors is deployed for both the count and logit components of the ZINB 
model, with exception of columns (3) through (5) where the share of FTC workers (and the hiring 
rate in the case of outcome Y3) is also introduced into the model. 
[Table 3 near here] 
Beginning with the results in column (1) of the table, note that for the logit the dependent 
dummy variable is defined as 1 if the number of TAWs in a given year is zero and 0 if there is a 
strictly positive number of temps working in the establishment. The logit model thus explains the 
determinants of not having any temps at all, whereas the count model explains the number of 
temps. Summarizing, the existence of a works council does not appear to be decisive in defining 
user/non-user status. Among users, however, works councils per se seemingly mitigate the number 
of temps (if volatility is zero), while cet. par. a higher demand volatility tends to reduce it in the 
absence of a works council although the correlation is only marginally significant. These are after 
all expected results. But the positive interaction term implies that the mitigating works council 
effect disappears when volatility increases. In order to clarify this effect, we plot the predicted 
outcome Y1 over the range of our demand volatility measure, splitting the full sample into 
establishments with a works council and without a works council, with all other covariates set at 
their corresponding sample mean.8 As can be seen from panel (a) of Figure 2, the predicted number 
of TAWs increases when a works council is present and decreases when it is absent. The indication 
is therefore that in order to protect the core workforce from demand shocks, works councils may 
be more likely to agree to form a cushion of such temporary workers when volatility is high. In 
absolute size, the magnitude of the effect is less than 1 agency temp over the range of observed 
volatility. In the absence of workplace representation, establishments are likely to be less 
constrained in their decision making and less dependent on TAWs in input adjustment. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
The pattern regarding the extensive and intensive use of workers with FTCs shown in 
column (2) of the table is distinct. First, we do not report statistical significance for any of the labor 
institution variables in the logit model, which means that the use or non-use of FTC workers is 
fully determined by our fairly extensive set of control variables (industry affiliation and 
establishment size, inter al.). We note parenthetically that the null of the negative binomial (NB) 
versus ZINB is clearly rejected by the data. This means that the zero-inflated model is indeed better 
suited for the data. (Discussion of the diagnostic tests is given below.) Second, and more as 
expected a higher volatility of output demand increases the number of FTC workers in the absence 
of a works council. Third, works councils are nevertheless associated with a decreased labor 
adjustment at the margin through FTCs when volatility increases. Again, to best illustrate this 
result, we plot in panel (b) of Figure 2 the predicted Y2, following the procedure described above. 
As can be seen, the absolute magnitude of the effect is larger in non-works council establishments 
than in establishments with works councils. Observe that in the presence of works councils high 
demand volatility is associated with lower use of FTCs. Interestingly, in both panels of Figure 2 
the pattern is virtually linear with no evidence of any change in works council behavior across the 
different levels of demand volatility.  
For the logit model given in column (3) of the table, establishments with a works council 
are marginally more likely to apply a FTC in respect of at least one of their new hires. For users, 
both high demand volatility and the presence of a works council are associated with a greater 
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number of FTCs among new hires at a very high level of statistical significance, which suggests 
that these contracts can play two roles: screening and a labor input adjustment mechanism. The 
interaction term is negative, as in column (2), but the actual implication is that for both works 
council and non-works council establishments higher volatility is associated with a greater number 
of new hires with a FTC. For parsimony, we do not present the plots for the predicted outcome Y3 
over the range of demand volatility measure in Figure 2 but they are available upon request.  
A related issue is the transition from a FTC to a permanent contract with the firm. The 
results in column (4) of the table suggest that establishments are more likely to opt for this strategy 
both at the intensive and extensive margins whenever a works council is present, although the 
statistical significance is clearly weaker than in the previous columns. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative and produces the expected reduction in the number of transitions as 
volatility increases for works-council establishments. Not surprisingly, a higher share of trained 
workers is positively associated with a higher number of FTCs being converted into permanent, 
open-ended contracts, but not at a statistically significant level. More surprising perhaps is the 
positive coefficient of the training variable in the logit, as it suggests that the higher the share of 
trained workers, the greater is the likelihood that the firm will not convert fixed-term contracts into 
permanent contracts. More in accordance with our priors, is the result in column (5), that a higher 
training share reduces the number of FTC renewals, while impacting positively the chance of a 
firm refraining from this policy in general (the coefficient is negative in the logit). Works councils 
in turn seem to favor to the use of FTC renewals (significant at the 5% level), but no impact is 
detected on the intensive margin. Neither demand volatility per se nor its interaction with the works 
council variable is statistically significant in the count model. 
Note that all the diagnostic tests reported at the base of Table 3 perform according to our 
expectations. First, the hypothesis of overdispersion is confirmed because the null (i.e. alpha=0) is 
comfortably rejected in all five columns of the table. There is therefore no empirical evidence to 
suggest that an ordinary Poisson count model would be the appropriate regression vehicle. The 
second diagnostic is provided by the Voung test that compares the null of an ordinary negative 
binomial model with a zero-inflated negative binomial. Again, the null is easily rejected. Finally, 
in comparing the ZINB and ZIP models, the corresponding likelihood ratio test comfortably rejects 
the null that the latter offers a better fit than the former. 
We next provide some robustness tests for establishment size, given that the legal rights of 
works councils are defined according to certain size thresholds (Addison 2009: 16-19). 
Specifically, we want to test whether our results hold for the subsets of establishments with 21 to 
100 and 21 to 249 employees. In the interests of economy, results for just the latter subsample are 
given in Appendix Table 1 (findings for the former sample are available upon request). Despite 
the material reduction in sample size, the results for this subset very much resemble those reported 
earlier in Table 3. That is, we again find that works councils are positively associated with new 
hires with a FTC and negatively with the number of TAWs. Demand volatility and its interaction 
with the works council variable also maintains the same signs throughout (viz. Y1 to Y4). Further, 
and by way of illustration, we can also confirm that high volatility is associated with a lower use 
of FTC workers in works council establishments (see Addison et al. 2018: Appendix Figure 1).   
According to Table 3, sectoral agreements are seemingly associated with a non-use of 
TAWs (in the logit equation), while their role in this regard for the remaining outcome indicators 
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is statically opaque.  In the count model, sectoral agreements are associated with a lower number 
of FTCs and a reduction in new hires with a FTC. 
To further clarify the role of collective bargaining and workplace representation, we 
decided to include a sectoral agreements-works council interaction term in our ZINB model 
estimates. In the interests of transparency, and given the largely unexplored relation between works 
councils and local collective bargaining (see section II), we excluded all firm-level collective 
agreements.  That is, we next focus on the sample of establishments with sectoral agreements and 
without collective agreements of any kind. Appendix Table 2 replicates Table 3 for this reduced 
sample of establishments. We confirm the finding from Table 3 that sectoral agreements seemingly 
militate against the use of TAWs, while the association is exactly the opposite, albeit insignificant, 
for stand-alone works councils. Among users of temps, the signs of the two coefficient estimates 
are maintained, and on this occasion the coefficient estimate for works council presence is now 
weakly statistically significant. The new interaction term in turn shows that the joint presence of 
the two entities is associated with a reduced number of TAWs. No statistically significant such 
relationship is found for Y2. The interaction term achieves significance for Y3, its negative sign 
indicating that the two institutions are associated with a reduced number of new hires with a FTC. 
 
V. Further Testing 
Finally, we exploit some additional data to further clarify the determinants of the employment of 
FTCs and TAW. Ideally, the analysis using this enhanced information should be performed for the 
entire 2006-2015 sample period. Unfortunately, the supplementary data in question are available 
for just one year, with the result that our tests are perforce based on a single cross section for 2010. 
The first new element offers a broader sample characterization of the hiring of TAWs, 
using the unique information from question 49 of the 2010 IAB survey, which inquires of 
establishments their most important reason for hiring agency temps in the preceding two years. 
From a descriptive point of view, we wish to ascertain whether there is any discernible pattern 
linking works council status and, say, ‘demand uncertainty,’ here defined by the answers A (i.e. 
‘fast availability of required labor’), B (‘duration of assignment is expected to be short’), and D 
(‘uncertainty about economic prospects’). The other reasons for hiring temps are either grouped 
into items E and F or C and G, descriptions of which are given in Table 4. 
[Table 4 near here] 
As shown in the table, demand uncertainty is indeed crucial to understanding TAW. In 
approximately 90% of the cases, either A, B, or D is reported as the most important factor in hiring 
decisions. This is not at all surprising given the regression results in Table 3, where our proxy for 
output demand volatility plays a key role. Perhaps the main point to be taken from Table 4, 
however, is that there is no obvious pattern connecting the reasons for TAW with works council 
(or collective bargaining) status. In short, any unobserved factors associated with the reasons why 
establishments are hiring temps do not seem to vary materially with the labor institution variables.  
A second issue pertains to human resource management (HRM) practices. At stake is the 
possible relationship between certain HRM practices and labor institutions, one conjecture being 
that these practices ultimately have the potential to impact worker representation through works 
councils and collective bargaining. If, for example, a given type of HRM practice results in less 
need for worker representation at the plant level and at the same time has an impact on the 
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deployment of temporary workers, omission of the argument can bias the regression results. To 
examine the issue, we again make use of the new information contained in the 2010 survey. 
Specifically, question 29 asks which of 10 practices were the most important changes implemented 
at the establishment in the last two years. We selected the items ‘downward shifting of 
responsibilities and decisions,’ ‘introduction of team work/working groups with their own 
responsibilities,’ and ‘improvement of quality management’ as indicators of the presence of HRM 
practices. Table 5 gives the corresponding percentage of establishments in which these practices 
are considered dominant (i.e. the most important). Among the 10 items the incidence of these three 
particular practices is quite sizeable: in 21 to 24% of the cases, establishments identified one of 
the three items as the most important change to have taken place over the two-year interval. 
Observe that the evidence also suggests that the incidence is virtually the same across works 
council and collective agreement groups. On this basis, any HRM practice omitted in Table 3 does 
not seem to be associated with any particular labor institution in any obvious manner.  
[Table 5 near here] 
A separate issue is whether the omission of any measure of unionization is also likely to 
be damaging to our findings in Table 3. Since unionization may be correlated with works council 
and collective bargaining status on the one hand and the outcome variable on the other, omission 
of a unionization variable might be a confounding factor. Introducing some measure of unionism 
might therefore allow us to offer an improved causal relation. 
We note that in the context of the ZINB model specified in Table 3, an ideal solution would 
be to select a relevant instrument from the IAB Establishment Panel. However, not only is there 
no information on trade union density in the survey but also, to our knowledge, no possibility of 
implementing an IV approach within the framework of a zero-inflated negative binomial model. 
Rather, our approach will instead amount in the first instance to deploying (lagged) sector-level 
union density information, extracted from the 2009 European Company Survey (ECS), and then 
re-running the models specified in Table 3. Given that the information on trade union density 
pertains to 2009, this part of our analysis is again confined to the 2010 cross-section. 
In this final exercise, we first replicated the model specification in column (1) of Table 3 
for the year 2010. We then introduced in two separate regressions (a) the trade union density 
argument from the ECS, and (b) two alternative indicators of unionism, namely the sectoral mean 
incidence of industry-level and firm-level agreements, both of which variables were based on IAB 
survey material. Summarizing briefly the results of this exercise, which are available upon request, 
we found that although the 2010 results were statistically weaker, the two samples (i.e. the 2010 
cross-section and the 2006-2015 pooled data) yielded not dissimilar results. Moreover, our model 
results were not sensitive to the introduction of the union density argument, suggesting that there 
is little evidence to indicate that omission of the variable biases our results in any obvious manner. 
Finally, the inclusion of the proxies for the unionization measure produced yet weaker results. But 
again there was no indication that, despite the limitation introduced by the strong reduction in 
sample size, unobserved characteristics connected with unionization were driving the results 
obtained in Table 3 in any overt way. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
16 
 
This study has provided a comprehensive analysis of the use of temporary employment, both at 
the extensive and intensive margins. It distinguishes between fixed-term contract workers and 
temporary agency workers in Germany over a period of one decade, starting in 2006. It should be 
recalled that even though these groups constitute a modest share of the total workforce, they have 
often been important sources of all new job creation in the post-Hartz years. 
In a new departure, our analysis has applied a zero-inflated negative binomial model to the 
data to reflect the obvious but often ignored fact that most establishments are non-users of fixed-
term contracts or temporary agency workers. Motivated by this empirical regularity, we sought to 
investigate the potential effect of two key labor institutions – works councils and collective 
agreements – on the use and intensity of use of temporary employment over the sample period. 
Our approach involved looking at separate but connected outcomes, namely two stocks (the 
number of TAWs and workers with FTCs observed at a given point in time in each year) and three 
flow variables associated with FTCs (the number of new hires with a fixed-term contract, 
conversions of fixed-term contracts into regular employment with the firm, and the extension or 
renewal of fixed-term contracts), calculated over a six-month interval in each year. Given the cross 
section nature of our data, we also undertook a number of robustness checks and conducted a 
further examination of possible confounding factors. 
Among our principal findings for the stock dependent variables are the following. First, we 
find strong statistical support for the ZINB model. Second, from the perspective of adjustment at 
the extensive margin, there is little indication that our labor institution variables are correlated with 
the use/non-use of either type of temporary work, especially in the case of fixed-term contracts. 
Third, collective bargaining has different ‘effects’ on (strictly, associations with) the intensity of 
use of temporary employment: sectoral agreements are associated with reduced intensity of use of 
workers with FTCs, while firm-level agreements are associated with more intensive use of TAW. 
Fourth, greater product market volatility per se does not display a unique relation with temporary 
employment: a positive correlation can only be found in the case of the number of workers with 
FTCs. Fifth, and potentially most important of all, is the covariation between the number of 
temporary employees and the interaction between works councils and product market volatility. 
In this case, our simulation exercise using the demand volatility measured over its entire range 
indicates that, all else constant, the use of TAWs (workers on FTCs) is predicted to rise (decline) 
if volatility increases whenever a works council is present. The reasons for the latter set of findings 
are not transparent and require further examination. If anything on the assumption that TAW offers 
greater flexibility in meeting product volatility than FTCs, which we suggested earlier may 
function more as a port of entry, we might have expected the results obtained for FTCs to be more 
applicable to TAWs. One possibility is that works councils may tolerate increased use of agency 
temps in extreme circumstances when the very survival of the core is at stake, whereas increased 
use of workers with FTCs in such circumstances might be viewed as more adversarial in nature.   
 The noncomplementarity of the two types of contracts emerges as perhaps the hallmark of 
this study. The parallel ZINB analysis of the correlates of three FTC flow variables also favors this 
interpretation. 
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Endnotes 
1. However, to anticipate our emphasis upon the cycle, see the most recent German study on the 
issue by Jahn and Rusholm (2018), who argue that the mixed effects reported in the literature on 
the role of temporary employment as a stepping-stone to regular employment reflect the strong 
cyclicality of the demand for such workers, leading to (counter) cyclicality in the stepping-stone 
effect as well.  
2. That said, in circumstances of strategic intensive use of temps by management (see Holst, 
Nachtwey, and Dörre 2009), works councils and labor unions have sought to cap the number of 
agency temps that may be sent to the user company. Relatedly, some collective agreements have 
required the automatic hiring of temps as permanent employees after some interval (see, for 
example, Schild and Petzold 2009).    
3. Bryson’s (2013) own investigation of temporary agency workers uses British WERS data. He 
reports that the presence of agency temps exhibits no well-defined association with (three measures 
of) labor productivity. However, there is a strong positive association with financial performance 
and a negative association between the presence of temps in the employees’ occupation and wages 
in that occupation. Although he cautions against a causal interpretation, Bryson’s results are more 
supportive of a segmented labor market in which TAW adversely impacts employees’ work 
experience. 
4. The authors compute the union effect at different values of volatility. Their IV results for the 
fullest specification indicate that unions increase the proportion of workers with FTCs by 2.7 
percentage points when volatility is low (viz. at the first decile of the volatility distribution), that 
the union effect is to all intents and purposes zero if volatility is at the median, and that it becomes 
-5.1 percentage points when volatility is high (viz. at the 90th percentile). Parallel results are 
obtained when using the FE estimates. 
5. The ZIP model is rather less cumbersome than the corresponding ZINB and is offered here for 
didactic purposes only. As will be shown below, the ZIP model is easily rejected against the ZINB 
alternative in our data.  
6. Comparable figures using weighted data are available upon request. They show the same pattern 
over time. Only the scale is different, in that establishments with at least one temp, one new hire, 
one FTC conversion, and one FTC renewal – panels (a) through (d), respectively – are over-
represented in the unweighted data. 
7. The observed overdispersion suggests that OLS regression cannot be an adequate modeling tool. 
Indeed, by comparing actual frequencies with those fitted frequencies it is clear that the ZINB 
model best fits the data, plainly outperforming the OLS (and PROBIT) cases. As a matter of fact, 
for all outcomes the difference between the predicted and the actual frequency is always less than 
1 percentage point in the ZINB case (see Addison et al. 2018: Table 3).  
8. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach, which proved to be a 
suitable procedure to evaluate the impact of the interaction term given the non-linearity of the 
ZINB model (see Ai and Norton 2003). 
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Table 1: Variable Definition and Establishment-Level Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
Definition 
Sample 
All establishments Establishments 
with a works 
council 
Establishments 
without a works 
council 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Y1 Number of temporary agency workers (TAWs) 97,060 5.720 27,264 17.789 69,581 0.971 
Y2 Number of FTC workers in the establishment  97,538 9.620 27,333 22.258 69,986 4.668 
Y3 Number of new hires with a FTC (from Jan. to June) 97,311 3.590 27,230 7.356 69,863 2.130 
Y4 Number of FTC workers converted into permanents (from Jan. to 
June). 
Sample restricted to establishments employing at least 1 FTC. 
43,876 3.000 20,659 4.171 23,118 1.952 
Y5 Number of workers with a FTC renewed in the Jan-June interval. 
Sample restricted to establishments employing at least 1 FTC. 
28,575 2.470 13,217 3.262 15,311 1.777 
        
Works council 1/0 dummy: 1 if a works council is present 97,920 0.281 27,443 0.263 70,125 0.674 
Sectoral agreement 
1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment is bound by an industry-wide 
wage agreement 
97,769 0.372 27,443 0.565 70,125 0.296 
Firm-level agreement 
1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment is bound by a company-level 
wage agreement 
97,769 0.070 27,443 0.172 70,125 0.031 
Product demand 
volatility 
(volatility) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each year and for each industry, demand volatility is given by 
the average standard deviation of establishment log sales; that is, 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = (
1
𝑁𝑖−1
∑ {log(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑒
𝑁𝑖
𝑒=1 − log(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑖}
2)1/2, where 
subscripts e and i denote establishment and industry, respectively, 
and 𝑁𝑖 the number of establishments in industry i (and where 
subscript t is omitted). In a second step, we take the average of the 
past 6 years, so that the demand volatility measure in year t is the 
average over t-1, t-2, …, t-6. The sample comprises a total of 
forty-three, 3-digit level industries. 
97,160 1.930 27,539 0.231 70,381 0.222 
Establishment size:        
5-9 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has 5 to 9 employees 98,160 0.234 27,539 0.020 70,381 0.318 
10-19 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has 10 to19 employees 98,160 0.177 27,539 0.043 70,381 0.230 
20-49 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has 20 to 49 employees 98,160 0.226 27,539 0.139 70,381 0.260 
50-99 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has 50 to 99 employees 98,160 0.127 27,539 0.176 70,381 0.108 
100-249 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has 100 to 249 employees 98,160 0.123 27,539 0.282 70,381 0.060 
250+ 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment has at least 250 employees 98,160 0.112 27,539 0.339 70,381 0.023 
Establishment age:        
Before 1990 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment was founded before 1990 96,993 0.453 27,187 0.619 69,602 0.388 
1990-1999 
1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment was founded between 1990 and 
1999 
96,993 0.309 27,187 0.237 69,602 0.337 
After 1999 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment was founded after 1999 96,993 0.238 27,187 0.144 69,602 0.275 
Workforce 
composition: 
       
Share of women Share of female employees 98,107 0.396 27,505 0.353 70,363 0.413 
Share of part-time Share of part-time employees 94,935 0.109 26,622 0.123 68,118 0.104 
Share of unskilled 
workers 
 
Share of employees hired for simple tasks that do not require any 
vocational training certificate or corresponding professional 
experience 
98,143 0.191 27,527 0.187 70,377 0.192 
Share of skilled 
workers  
Share of employees hired for complex tasks that require either a 
vocational training certificate, a corresponding measure of 
professional experience, or a university or college degree 
98,140 0.696 27,524 0.758 70,377 0.671 
Western Germany 1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment is located in Western Germany 98,160 0.629 27,539 0.704 70,381 0.599 
Wage bill Sum of gross wages paid in June (in logs) 82,640 11.00 22,677 12.878 59,804 10.281 
Export  1/0 dummy: 1 if the establishment engages in exporting 98,160 0.306 27,539 0.498 70,381 0.231 
Outsourcing 
1/0 dummy: 1 if parts of the establishment’s activities have been 
outsourced 
97,419 0.012 27,354 0.026 69,834 0.007 
State-of-art technology 
  
 
1/0 dummy: 1 if the overall technical state of the plant, machinery, 
and equipment of the establishment is state-of-the-art, compared 
with other establishments in the same industry (1 or 2 in the 1 to 5 
Likert scale) 
97,780 0.683 27,369 0.692 70,197 0.680 
Competitive pressure 1/0 dummy: 1 if competitive pressure is reported to be high 78,040 0.446 21,117 0.537 56,757 0.411 
Training 
  
Share of employees with further training (from January through 
June) 
86,321 0.234 23,132 0.276 63,021 0.219 
Hiring rate Number of hires divided by the total number of employees 97,742 0.065 27,400 0.039 70,121 0.074 
Share of fixed-term 
contracts 
Share of employees with a fixed-term contract 97,538 0.056 27,333 0.062 69,986 0.053 
Note: The sample comprises all the establishments with at least 5 employees in the private, for profit sector. 19 separate 
industries are used for estimation purposes. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2006-2015.  
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Table 2: Frequency Distribution of the Selected Five Response Variables (in percent) 
 
All establishments 
Count 
0 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-999 ≥1000 
Relative frequency:      Y1 80.9 11.2 5.6 1.3 1.0 0.04 
Y2 57.5 26.8 11.5 2.2 1.9 0.04 
Y3 70.4 22.3 5.9 0.8 0.6 0.004 
Y4 53.5 39.6 6.1 0.5 0.3 – 
Y5 69.6 24.7 4.9 0.5 0.3 – 
Note: Y1 through Y5 are defined in Table 1. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2006-2015.    
 
Table 3: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Model Estimates 
 Dependent variable 
No. of TAWs, Y1  
 
(1) 
No. of FTC 
Workers, Y2  
(2) 
No. of New Hires 
with a FTC, Y3  
(3) 
No. of FTC 
Conversions, Y4  
(4) 
No. of FTC 
Renewals, Y5  
(5) 
Count model:      
Works council -1.013 (0.336)*** 0.110 (0.191) 0.647 (0.153)*** 0.156 (0.244) -0.244 (0.306) 
Sectoral agreement 0.055 (0.065) -0.073 (0.032)** -0.045 (0.021)** 0.009 (0.040) 0.015 (0.048) 
Firm-level agreement 0.208 (0.074)*** 0.010 (0.044) -0.007 (0.031) 0.001 (0.047) 0.062 (0.060) 
Product demand volatility -0.291 (0.149)* 0.202 (0.087)** 0.546 (0.067)*** 0.191 (0.117) 0.111 (0.137) 
Volatility *works council 0.476 (0.163)*** -0.248 (0.097)** -0.400 (0.076)*** -0.224 (0.120)* 0.089 (0.151) 
Training    0.049 (0.053) -0.122 (0.073)* 
Logit:      
Works council -0.276 (0.420) -0.678 (0.478) -0.754 (0.428)* -0.679 (0.489) -0.938 (0.405)** 
Sectoral agreement 0.271 (0.066)*** -0.071 (0.056) 0.012 (0.070) 0.076 (0.123) 0.039 (0.080) 
Firm-level agreement 0.042 (0.098) -0.117 (0.104) -0.110 (0.108) -0.048 (0.153) -0.010 (0.105) 
Product demand volatility 0.179 (0.148) -0.070 (0.124) -0.038 (0.168) 0.217 (0.236) -0.045 (0.185) 
Volatility *works council -0.165 (0.207) -0.001 (0.244) 0.332 (0.217) 0.587 (0.250)** 0.464 (0.207)** 
Training    0.644 (0.209)*** -0.335 (0.120)*** 
Outcome-specific controls 
  Share of FTCs; 
Hiring rate 
Share of FTCs 
 
Share of FTCs 
Diagnostic tests:      
(H0) No overdispersion (or 
alpha=0); 
versus (H1) overdispersion 
alpha =1.95 
95% interval: 
 (1.85;  2.05) 
1.19 
 
(1.15; 1.22) 
0.69 
 
(0.67; 0.71) 
1.13 
 
(1.07; 1.20) 
1.29 
 
(1.19; 1.40) 
(H0) Negative binomial model 
versus (H1) ZINB; Vuong test 
z = 27.60 
[p-value: 0.000] 
32.69 
[0.0000] 
61.40 
[0.0000] 
15.46 
[0.0000] 
15.52 
[0.0000] 
(H0) ZIP model 
versus (H1) ZINB 
chibar2(1)= 2.8e+05  
[p-value:  0.0000] 
0.3e+05 
[0.0000] 
1.0e+05 
[0.0000] 
4.8e+04 
[0.0000] 
3.4e+04 
[0.0000] 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood   -59,276.28   -11,0572.3 -60,613.94 -43,725.32 -27,828.98 
Number of observations 61,668 61,420 61,039 26,476 21,652 
Notes: The alpha statistic tests whether there is evidence of overdispersion. If alpha=0 is not rejected, there is no overdispersion 
and an ordinary count (Poisson) model is appropriate. The Vuong test compares the null of a standard negative binomial model 
vis-à-vis a zero-inflated negative binomial, while the likelihood ratio test, in the third row of the diagnostic block, compares the 
ZIP model (the null) against the ZINB model. In both cases, rejection of the null implies that ZINB is the preferred specification. 
The model includes industry, year, establishment size (employment), and location dummies. Further controls include 
establishment age, the share of women/of part-time workers/of employees hired for simple tasks that do not require any 
vocational training/of employees hired for complex tasks that require either vocational training or a university degree, the 
logarithm of the wage bill, and dummies for exports, outsourcing, state of technology and competitive pressure. Robust (cluster) 
standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2006-2015.    
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Table 4: The Most Important Reasons for Hiring Agency Workers (in percent) 
  Speedy availability; 
short duration of 
assignment; and 
uncertainty about 
economic 
prospects 
(A, B or D) 
Avoidance of costs 
in staff acquisition 
and separations; 
and ascertaining 
the worker’s 
aptitude 
(E or F) 
Required 
qualification is 
hard to find; and 
other reasons  
 
 
(C or G) 
Works council: 1 88.2 6.0 5.7 
0 86.6 5.2 8.2 
Type of collective 
agreement: 
No collective agreement 86.5 6.3 7.2 
Firm-level agreement 87.3 6.3 6.3 
Sector-level agreement 88.7 4.7 6.6 
Notes: The reported percentages are based on questions 49b of the 2010 IAB Establishment Panel questionnaire. Items A through 
G denote the most important reason for hiring agency workers: speedy availability of required labor [A]; duration of assignment 
is expected to be short (e.g. seasonal work, cover of peaks in demand) [B]; required qualification is hard to find on the regular 
labor market [C]; uncertainty about economic prospects [D]; avoidance of costs and work involved in staff acquisition and 
separations [E]; ascertaining the worker’s aptitude with a view to recruitment [F]; other reasons [G]. These items are mutually 
exclusive. 
 
 
Table 5: Indicators of Changes in Human Resource Management (HRM) Practices 
  HRM practices 
(E, F or I) 
Other changes 
A, B, C, D, G, H, or J 
No change 
Works council: 1 23.3 45.1 31.6 
0 20.6 25.6 53.8 
Type of collective 
agreement: 
No collective 
agreement 
21.3 29.2 49,5 
Firm-level 
agreement 
23.5 38.3 38.3 
Sector-level 
agreement 
20.7 33.1 46.2 
Notes: The reported percentages are based questions 29b of the 2010 IAB Establishment Panel questionnaire. Items A through J 
denote the most important change within the last two years: More reliance on internal labor [A]; expansion of purchase of 
products and services from external sources [B]; restructuring of procurement and distribution channels and/or of customer 
relations [C]; restructuring of departments or areas of activities [D]; dow-nward shifting of responsibilities and decisions [E]; 
introduction of team work/working groups with their own responsibilities [F]; introduction of units/departments carrying out their 
own cost and result calculations [G]; ecological measures in enterprise (e.g. eco, product and materials balances, eco audit) [H]; 
improvement of quality management [I]; others [J]. These items are mutually exclusive. 
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Figure 1: Temporary Agency Work, New Hires with a Fixed-Term Contract (FTC), FTC Conversions, and FTC 
Renewals (in percent) (unweighted) 
 (a) Temporary agency workers  
 
______ Temps in establishment’s workforce (left scale) 
- - - - - - Temps in establishment’s workforce in establishments with at least one temp (left scale) 
– – – –  Establishments with at least one temp (right scale) 
 
 
(b) New hires with a fixed-term contract in establishments with new hires 
 
______ New hires with a FTC in establishments with new hires 
- - - - - - New hires with a FTC in establishments with at least one new hire with a FTC 
– – – –  Establishments with at least one new hire with a FTC  
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(c) FTC conversions into open-ended contracts (OECs) in establishments with FTC workers 
 
______ Conversions of FTCs into OECs in establishments with FTC workers 
- - - - - - Conversions of FTCs into OECs in establishments with at least one FTC conversion 
– – – –  Establishments with at least one FTC conversion 
 
(d) FTC renewals in establishments with FTC workers 
 
______ FTC renewals in establishments with FTC workers 
- - - - - - FTC renewals in establishments with at least one FTC renewal 
– – – –  Establishments with at least one FTC renewal 
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Figure 2: Predicted Number of Agency Temps and Fixed-Term Contract Workers in Establishments with 
and without Works Council  
(a)  Predicted number of temporary agency workers   
 
 
(b)  Predicted number of fixed-term contract workers 
 
Notes: Establishments with at least 5 employees. The vertical bar denotes the 95% confidence interval 
for the corresponding level of product demand volatility. All other covariates included in the regression 
are set at their respective sample means.  
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Appendix Table 1: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Model Estimates for the Subsample of 
Establishments with 21 to 249 Employees 
 Dependent variable 
No. of TAWs, Y1  
 
(1) 
No. of FTC 
Workers, Y2  
 (2) 
No. of New Hires 
with a FTC, Y3 
 (3) 
No. of FTC 
Conversions, Y4  
 (4) 
No. of FTC 
Renewals, Y5  
 (5) 
Count model:      
Works council -1.033 (0.413)** 0.110 (0.223) 0.593 (0.154)*** -0.014 (0.279) No convergence 
Sectoral agreement 0.075 (0.081) -0.016 (0.036) -0.044 (0.023)* 0.012 (0.054)  
Firm-level agreement 0.215 (0.089)** 0.079 (0.052) 0.026 (0.032) 0.085 (0.059)  
Product demand volatility -0.381 (0.183)** 0.152 (0.101) 0.411 (0.062)*** 0.052 (0.118)  
Volatility *works council 0.478 (0.203)** -0.198 (0.113)* -0.344 (0.077)*** -0.121 (0.140)  
Training    0.052 (0.067)  
 
     
Logit:      
Works council -0.455 (0.512) -0.321 (0.534) 0.022 (0.601) -0.159 (0.635)  
Sectoral agreement 0.185 (0.083)** -0.036 (0.082) 0.120 (0.089) 0.127 (0.181)  
Firm-level agreement 0.005 (0.124) 0.014 (0.135) -0.078 (0.136) 0.140 (0.186)  
Product demand volatility 0.148 (0.176) 0.020 (0.158) -0.207 (0.221) 0.482 (0.283)*  
Volatility *works council -0.038 (0.253) -0.155 (0.277) -0.068 (0.304) 0.225 (0.327)  
Training    -0.842 (0.294)***  
Outcome-specific controls 
  Share of FTCs; 
Hiring rate 
Share of FTCs 
 
 
Number of observations 28,766 28,639 28,440 16,598  
Note: For each column, the diagnostic statistics are similar to those reported in Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 2: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) Model Estimates, Excluding Establishments 
with Firm-Level Collective Bargaining 
 Dependent variable 
No. of TAWs, Y1  
 
(1) 
No. of Workers 
with a FTC, Y2  
(2) 
No. of New Hires 
with a FTC, Y3  
(3) 
No. of FTC 
Conversions, Y4  
(4) 
No. of FTC 
Renewals, Y5  
(5) 
Count model:      
Works council -0.621 (0.363)* 0.173 (0.211) 0.626 (0.165)*** 0.238 (0.264) -0.462 (0.341) 
Sectoral agreement (SCB) 0.243 (0.120)** -0.033 (0.042) -0.007 (0.029) 0.047 (0.058) 0.089 (0.076) 
SCB * works council -0.286 (0.137)** -0.090 (0.060) -0.082 (0.043)* -0.091 (0.076) -0.074 (0.095) 
Product demand volatility -0.195 (0.153) 0.207 (0.091)** 0.564 (0.068)*** 0.237 (0.120)** -0.106 (0.137) 
Volatility *works council 0.336 (0.172)* -0.257 (0.104)** -0.379 (0.081)*** -0.245 (0.128)* 0.219 (0.166) 
Training    0.058 (0.057) -0.119 (0.084) 
Logit:      
Works council -0.324 (0.453) -0.681 (0.544) -0.999 (0.462)** -0.847 (0.592) -1.111 (0.461)** 
Sectoral agreement (SCB) 0.288 (0.088)*** -0.062 (0.063) -0.127 (0.088) -0.045 (0.177) -0.027 (0.129) 
SCB * works council 0.028 (0.132) -0.036 (0.148) 0.313 (0.138)** 0.286 (0.237) 0.172 (0.164) 
Product demand volatility 0.209 (0.152) -0.061 (0.128) -0.100 (0.176) 0.297 (0.273) -0.192 (0.193) 
Volatility *works council -0.150 (0.220) 0.028 (0.273) 0.385 (0.230)* 0.633 (0.284)** 0.547 (0.225)** 
Training    -0.644 (0.238)*** -0.330 (0.137)** 
Outcome-specific controls   Share of FTCs, 
Hiring rate 
Share of FTCs; 
Further training 
Share of FTCs; Further 
training; 
8 sectors instead of 19 
Diagnostic tests:      
(H0) No overdispersion (or 
alpha=0); 
versus (H1) overdispersion 
alpha =1.94 
95% interval: 
 (1.83;  2.05) 
1.20 
 
(1.16; 1.23) 
0.69 
 
(0.66; 0.71) 
1.18 
 
(1.11; 1.26) 
1.40 
 
(1.28; 1.53) 
(H0) Negative binomial 
model 
versus (H1) ZINB; Vuong 
test 
z = 26.15 
[p-value: 0.000] 
31.10 
[0.0000] 
  
58.84 
[0.0000] 
14.64 
[0.0000] 
13.03 
[0.0000] 
(H0) ZIP model 
versus (H1) ZINB 
chibar2(1)= 2.3e+05  
[p-value:  0.0000] 
3.7e+05 
[0.0000] 
9.0e+04 
[0.0000] 
4.4e+04 
[0.0000] 
3.3e+04 
[0.0000] 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood   -51,648.91   -99,098.8 -53,851.38 -38,717.13 -24,577.92 
Number of observations 57,650 57,412 57,059 23,854 19,502 
 
 
 
